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Introduction: Challenges of Complex Systems
Almost everyone recognizes that Cyberspace is a fact of daily life. Given its ubiquity, scale and scope, cyberspace -including the Internet, the hundreds of millions of computers it connects, its management, and the experiences it enableshas become a fundamental feature of the world we live in and has created a new reality for almost everyone in the developed world and rapidly growing numbers of people in the developing world.
Until recently cyberspace was considered largely a matter of low-politicsthe term used to denote background conditions and routine decisions and processes. By contrast, high politics is about national security, core institutions, and decision systems that are critical to the State, its interests, and its underlying values.
Cyberspace is now a matter of high politics. The new practice of turning off the Internet during times of unrest in various countries, the effective leakage of confidential government documents on Wikileaks, the cyber-attacks that accompanied recent events in Georgia and Estonia, and the use of cyber-based attacks to degrade Iran's nuclear capabilities all illustrate new challenges for the State system and the complexities created by the increasing salience of cyberspace and its enabling capabilities.
In short, all aspects of international relations today may well intersect with or rely upon one form of cyber venue or another. Cyberspace evolves rapidly, and these changes have occurred faster than our ability to fully appreciate their All things considered, the fact is that the scientific community has not yet developed a "map" of cyber features in international relations or even the basic coordinates required for such a map. While both systems are constructed by humans, they differ significantly in their characteristic features.
In this paper, we address the challenge of identifying, characterizing and, representing interdependencies within and across these two domains, as foundational to
understanding how any two domains as important and pervasive as cyberspace and international relations influence each other, on the one hand, and shape a joint domain on the other.
For systems defined by both technological and human complexities, Design Structure Matrix (DSM) has emerged as a useful technique for jointly analyzing fundamentally different domains (Steward, 1981) . The DSM is a simple tool to perform both the analysis and the management of complex systems. It enables the user to model, visualize, and analyze the dependencies among the entities of any system and derive suggestions for the improvement or synthesis of a system. Minimally, creating a DSM involves (1) identifying boundaries of a system (or systems) to be analyzed, (2) identifying the elements of the system(s), (3) identifying interactions/interdependencies/inferences among the elements and representing them as a matrix, and (4) analyzing the matrix. The final step of analysis may draw from techniques of matrix algebra or other disciplines such as graph theory, engineering systems, or network and complexity science. Overall, DSM provides a compact and clear representation of a complex system and captures interactions between the elements of a single system or multiple disparate systems.
Such a system has been used in the past to analyze more deterministic environments such as product architecture or an engineering design process (Ulrich, 2012; . By contrast, in this paper we create a DSM to explore a relatively non-deterministic environment, formed due to interconnections and interdependencies of Cyberspace with its rapidly evolving technology, and International Relations with its complex decision-making.
Our purpose here is to utilize the DSM method for tracking and analyzing the interdependencies anchored within the Internet, which forms the core of Cyberspace, with some extensions beyond this core; within the domain of International Relations (i.e., interactions among sovereign states and other entities in world politics); and the between these two domains. Thus, an important methodological contribution of this work has to do with abstracting the common elements shared by both systems, namely the actors, their attributes, functions, and connections. On this basis, a related contribution is to identify potential disconnects between the two systems.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents a brief review of international relations, old and new, in order to provide a situational context for our investigations. Then, in Section 3, we define the research questions that arise when considering Cyberspace and International Relations as an interdependent and integrated system, we can call Cyber International Relations. By definition, the joint system is characterized by the fundamentally different features of Cyberspace and of International Relations. However, they are connected by an important common element --decision actors affecting the structure and function of the separate and the joint entities. Section 4 develops a method for representing the joint domain. In Section 5, we analyze the matrix to answer questions raised in this paper. The conclusion in Section 6 synthesizes the lessons learned and discusses future research required to address the limitations of this paper.
International Relations: The "Old" and the "New"
A brief sketch of the traditional international system -the world of the 20 th Century -helps us highlight the new features created by the construction of cyberspace. Here we introduce briefly the traditional international relations and then turn to the "new" changes in the international system created almost entirely by the salience of cyberspace and its growth and expansion since the end of the 20 th Century.
Changes in Traditional International Relations
By definition, the traditional international system consists of interactions among sovereign states. The organizing principle, sovereignty, is the anchor upon which the entire system rests. Also by definition, all other actors and entities are derivative, legitimized at their origin by the State. At the end of World War II, there were 55 sovereign states. Today there is more than three times that number. The State remains the dominant actor but it is increasingly subject to pressures from various types of non-state actors. Below is a brief, illustrative review of recent changes in international relations to provide a context for the investigations that follow.
Among the important legacies of the twentieth century are the end of the Cold War, the consolidation of the United States as the only "hegemony" and the growth in the number of sovereign states (due to the decolonization process, the breakup of the Soviet Union, and common consensus), all with new claims on the international community. There are new regional centers of power with new political aspirations, and new competitions on a global scale. In addition, the evolution of new norms and the proliferation of international organizations -with diverse functions and responsibilities to facilitate development and sustainabilityprovide a legitimate basis for intrusion and influence deep into the structure of the State system.
The traditional systems of 20 th Century international relations -such as those with bi-polar, multipolar, or unipolar structures, and generally characterized by hierarchical power relations -have gradually given way to new structural configurations characterized by different types of asymmetries and relatively weak hierarchies, if any, thus replacing the well-known "vertically-organized" structures of power and influence.
We have seen the expansion of private and public interests coupled with the creation of new markets, and innovative practices that create overlapping spheres of influences and ever-fluid "playing fields" -each governed by distinctive rules and regulations -making it ever more difficult to understand and track the various systems of interaction. In some cases, we observe something akin to different entities behaving as if they were competing "sovereignties" seeking to expand their control and establish their legitimacy within and across the same territorial domains.
Various types of non-state actors -such as those focusing on development assistance and humanitarian needs, religious groups, those with various ideological or political agendas -seem to be growing faster than our ability to track and assess their roles and responsibilities, constraints and contributions, as well as threats and vulnerabilities.
We have also witnessed changes in the nature of conflict and war in all parts of the world. Large-scale war among major powers no longer seems likely, but we have seen the State seeking to retain control in its efforts to contain or prevent the evolution of new types of conflict and violence with varying degrees of formal organization. For example, wars for national liberation from colonial rule have gradually been superseded by conflicts waged by non-state actors, expansion of civil conflicts, and a wide range of terrorist initiatives. Conflicts between major powers over spheres of influence are replaced by contentions over control of these spheres by various local entities. (Afghanistan is a good case in point.)
Toward the end of the 20 th Century, we saw a gradual appreciation of the unintended consequences of economic growth as the prime target for all future developments, and a shift toward a quest for "sustainable development" -an improvement in the human condition devoid of the most damaging byproducts of growth. The potential for sustainability is now a central feature of the international agenda.
In sum, each one of these changes in traditional International Relations is embedded in its own situational context and is important in its own right. Jointly These are some of the more notable influences of cyberspace in international relations. While the proverbial skeptic will argue that "plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose", it is difficult to envisage a world in which we can effectively "roll back" any one of these factors to their pre-2000 status.
Research Questions: In Search of an Integrated System
We argue that the interwoven nature of cyberspace and international relations require the properties of information goods such as information security, control, or freedom, or those of international activities such as trade, or diplomacy to be framed in the context of emergent behaviors of a system where cyberspace interacts with traditional IR.
As yet, very little literature directly has taken on the problem of framing and examining cyberspace and international relations jointly.
Cyberpolitics in International
Relations (Choucri 2012 ) provides a detailed analysis of the impacts of cyberspace on international relations, and to some extent, ways in which the cyber domain has begun to influence world politics. Drawing on a traditional framework in the analysis of world politics, first introduced by Waltz (1959) and developed further by North (1990) . Choucri (2012) also addressed propensities for cyber conflict and cooperation, as well as contending models for the future of cyber politics. This provided the basis for exploring the interconnections between these two domains.
A joint paper entitled, "Cyberspace and International Relations: Toward an Integrated System" (Choucri and Clark 2012) addressed this issue from theoretical perspectives in computer science, engineering and political science. The Choucri-Clark paper develops a candidate framework-combining layered models of the cyberspace familiar to engineers, and levels of analysis familiar to political scientists-to position actors, functions, and current issues and concerns in the integrated Cyber International
Relations system. The present research takes its inspiration from these earlier works and develops a theoretically driven and empirically based framework of the joint domain of cyberspace and international relations.
Of the many complexities of Cyber-IR, we focus on two fundamental features of the multiple actors who perform in the joint domain: (1) role heterogeneity, in that the multiple actors operating in both Cyber and IR domains perform a variety of functions, and (2) attribute heterogeneity, because these actors are heterogeneous in their attributes.
Role Heterogeneity
The modular architecture of the Internet enables multiple actor types, as defined by the different roles they play in the design, provisioning, management, and usage of The above factors motivate the overarching query driving our research. It is this:
Does heterogeneity of the actors (their attributes and the functions they perform) create opportunities to gain advantage in the joint domain of cyberspace and international relations?
In this paper, we will focus on three specific questions related to this overarching query:
(1) Are some actors/ functions more important for the structure and performance of the Cyber-IR system than others? This question is important because many other functions in the Cyber-IR system depend on such functions. Therefore, muting of such a function hampers many dependent functions, and enabling it accentuates them, and thereby, the whole system.
(2) What dependencies are critical for functioning of Cyberspace, IR, and the relationship between the two? Given cyberspace is rapidly changing, highly fluid, and increasingly subject to technological innovations in some cases, and to State policies and interventions in others, the purpose of identifying such critical areas of dependencies is so that they can be tracked over time and studied in more detail in future work. 
Method and Application
Our purpose in using Design Structure Matrix (DSM) method is to construct the Cyber-IR Interdependency Matrix. However, to appropriately frame the scope of the matrix and make its structure and interpretation more relevant and meaningful to the overall investigation, we must create several additional constructs, meaning, rules and assumptions.
Overview of Methodology
The "raw" application of DSM generates a critical anchor for the remainder of the investigation. This anchor provides internal consistency in the logic of interconnections between the cyber domain and international relations. However, it is only an entry point for our investigation. More must be done. In Figure 1 , we provide an overview of the overall methodology and its application. Each step in Figure 1 can be viewed as Step 1: Identify important actors in Cyberspace and International Relations.
Rule 1: Differentiate actors based on a set of functions they perform with respect to the Internet, not the bases of functions they could potentially own.
Step 2: Identify core functions performed by the actors.
To enlist core functions of an actor ask the following question: can the actor be that actor without performing a given function? Rule 2: When attribute heterogeneity does not determine core functions performed: take core functions that the actor type performs. Rule 3: When attribute heterogeneity does determine core functions performed: take the union of all core functions that the actor type could perform.
Step 3: Identify interdependencies among core functions.
To identify interdependency between any two core functions ask the following question: Is "Function B" necessary to fully or partially perform "Function A"? If yes, then A depends on B. 
Operational Details: Application of the "Rules"
We now turn to a brief discussion of each step:
Step There are other actors, to be sure, but for the sake of parsimony, we highlight the most relevant.
Step 2: Identifying core functions performed by the actors
The second step is to identify the core functions of an actor. These are a set of functions it must perform to be that actor type. For example, providing connectivity and
Internet service are core functions of an ISP, without which it would cease to be an ISP. Second, the final core function -generate funds to survive -is relevant for all actors, except possibly the State. We interpret this function broadly. While financial viability is important for all, mechanisms for survival could be different for different actors. For example, with the exception of individual users, for all Internet-related actors "to survive" means remaining profitable by managing revenues and costs (when the actor is private), or being supported by the State (when State-owned). By contrast, for a State, the notion of fund generation in this matrix is limited to funds necessary to support viable cyber access where such funds may be generated through a combination of taxation of individuals and businesses, import, and export, etc. The survival of a State is a concept that has implications far beyond this inquiry, so it is not addressed here.
Third, for many actors, the attribute heterogeneity does not change the core functions they must perform. For example, Equipment Providers, Device Makers, and Application Providers must perform the same core functions whether they are small, medium, or large, for profit or not-for-profit, local or international. In this case, we simply use Rule 2 described in Figure 2 . By contrast, for some actors, attribute heterogeneity does determine the core functions they perform. For example, small ISPs may not directly connect to the Internet backbone, not all individuals develop Internet applications, or all states do not own ISPs, and so on. In this case, we apply Rule 3 described in Figure 2 to take a union of core functions an actor type performs to arrive at the complete list.
Finally, two methodological issues must be noted. First, as stated in Rule 1 of Figure 2 the Internet actors and their functions were identified according to functions they do perform, and not functions they could potentially own. For example, an ISP could also decide to become an information platform, but the majority does not.
The second methodological issue is whether the functional classification is identified at the appropriate level of aggregation. For example, is it better to aggregate equipment providers, device makers, and application providers into a single actor called hardware/software providers? Conversely, could we not disaggregate platform providers into information platforms, communications platforms, and applications? We argue that the disaggregation of actor-type produced here is appropriate, as any further aggregation would result in loss of information (Rule 5, Figure 2 ). For example, if we were to combine Equipment Providers and Device Makers into an aggregated actor, ISP's unique dependencies on equipment providers and individual's unique dependencies on the device makers will not have to be attributed to this new aggregated actor, thereby inflicting some loss of information. Such choices related to the levels of aggregation raise important qualitative issues that must be kept in mind when interpreting the results.
Step 3: Identify dependencies among core functions Having identified and listed the core functions of actors, we now seek to identify the interdependencies among the core functions they perform. To identify interdependency between any two core functions, we ask the following question: Is The second way we analyze the matrix is by converting the qualitative matrix to a binary matrix, where a populated cell is marked as "1" and empty cells as "0."
From the binary matrix, we can begin to study the nature of interdependencies algebraically. Doing so allows us to analyze the question we raised earlier about the relative importance of actors and functions in the Cyber-IR system.
Analysis, Results, and "Lessons"
We now turn to analysis of the dependency matrix to answer the research questions we raised in Section 3. Procedurally, we focus on Question 1 and 2, and in discussing them interweave the implications of Question 3.
Question 1: Are some actors/ functions more important in Cyber-IR than others?
To answer this question, let us look at two different views of the dependencies:
functions most depended upon (Figure 4) , and most dependent functions. Figure 4 should be considered important because many other functions in the Cyber-IR system depend on them. So, muting of such highly depended upon functions hampers many dependent functions, and enabling it accentuates them, and thereby, the whole system. We address this question by noting results and drawing lessons about the nature of dependencies in four domains: Within Cyberspace, within IR, and those at the seams (of Cyberspace on IR, and of IR on Cyberspace). Below, we highlight these findings sequentially as classified in these four domains. 15 As noted earlier, the purpose of identifying such critical areas of dependencies is so that they can be examined in greater detail when needed.
(a) Results on Dependencies within Cyberspace
First: technological dependencies run from upper (e.g., applications) onto the lower Internet layers (e.g., service), which is a fact that engineers have known for long since each layer of the Internet is relatively autonomous. However, this is not always true. For properties such as security, the dependencies are at all layers of the Internet. Such dependency increases coordination costs and reduces speed at which decisions can be made. 
(d) Results on Dependencies at the Seams (of IR on Cyberspace)

Conclusion
We began this paper with three questions: (1) Are some actors/functions more important for the structure and performance of the Cyber-IR system than others? (2) What dependencies are critical for the functioning of the Internet, IR, and the relationship between the two? (3) How do actor attributes inform the findings pertaining to questions (1) and (2)? The body of the paper addressed each question and presented the results. In this conclusion, we take a step further to highlight some of the implications.
Our analysis began with an observation that, because cyber and international relations are sufficiently interwoven in various ways, they best be viewed as an integrated system. This can only be done if their interconnections and linkages are systematically identified. Furthermore, it is essential that we first identify and understand the properties of the joint system in its static form before we can improve our understanding of dynamic change or emergent behaviors --as well as sources and consequences thereof.
The Logic of Inquiry
In the absence of quantitative foundations for an integrated investigation, we selected to utilize a methodology that allows us to represent the structure of a system. We have selected to use the design structure matrix method (DSM) and to augment (extend or enhance) its core features in order to address the challenge at hand. By augmenting DSM with several essential functions, we derived an empirically based representation of a joint system cyber-IR system.
As we proceeded, our investigation exposed clusters of dependencies that are most critical to the conduct of activities in the cyber domain and in international relations. We focused on four specific areas: (i) within Cyberspace, (ii) within IR, (iii)
Cyberspace dependence on IR, and (iv) IR dependence on Cyberspace. We have found that the two domains "at the seams" -meaning, where Cyberspace depends upon IR and vice versa-are most revealing of potential changes in each of the individual domains. In addition, the revealing signals "at the seams" are due largely to the interactions between the two domains, the cyber and the international.
Furthermore, by synthesizing the lessons learnt about the dependencies "at the seams" (answer to Q2) in conjunction with the relative criticality of these dependencies (answer to Q1); we are able to derive some predictive inferences, despite the fact that our inquiry created a dependency matrix that is purely static in form.
Cyber Dependence on the State
It is true that in its early years, the Internet grew in the United States in research labs followed by the private sector (Abbate, 1999) . This is the reason for the regulatory dilemma about whether and how much to regulate it (Vaishnav, 2010) . At the global scale, however, our analysis reveals that the growth of the Internet, or more fully the cyberspace, has not been as independent from the State as we usually believed. Arguably, as the State becomes more cognizant of the criticality of cyberspace in performing some of its important functions, they may become even more strategic and possibly effective in preserving and managing these points of control. Thus, while the cyber domain has always been dependent on the State, such dependence may grow further.
State External Functions Dependence on Cyberspace
Our analysis shows that two functions traditionally considered critical in IR are deeply intertwined with cyberspace today. First is the security of State cyber infrastructure that is determined by the level of security at all layers of the cyberspace. 
Dynamic Inquiry Necessary
The interdependencies of the State and cyber examined in this paper -and the methodology that we have employed -are based largely on a static logic. Nonetheless, we have been able highlight some important features of structure and function in both domains and in their interconnections. Clearly, this is only a first but important, 13 Concerns interconnection and peering in the Internet backbone.
14 As discussed in the next section, we produce qualitative and binary versions of the dependency matrix.
The matrix shown in the Appendix is the binary matrix with all the cells with 0's turned into empty cells, to enhance readability. 15 The lessons discussed in this section are deduced from the analysis of the qualitative the matrix in the Appendix. The footnotes to follow detail the analysis behind each of the ten lessons in this section. Please read these methodological notes in conjunction with matrix in the appendix. as coordinating radio communications services, international management of radio spectrum and satellite services, or coordinating emerging markets, must normatively have, involvement of WTO through their functions such as implementing and monitoring trade agreements, and dispute resolution is inevitable. In this sense, our conclusion predicts that the matrix Y1-X4 is likely to become denser, and it would be better if the interactions between these two institutions are put in place proactively rather than as an afterthought. 20 Methodological note for fifth lesson: this lesson simply reflects the operationalization of Rule 3 we discussed in Figure 1 . 
